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Leading By Example: An Holistic Approach to
Individual Disparate Treatment Law
Michael J. Zimmer
Editor's Note: Mr. Zimmer's remarks were initiallypresented at the 2001 Journal
Symposium: A Ten Year Perspectiveon the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

In Reeves v. Sanderson PlumbingProducts,Inc.,' the Supreme Court overturned
the Fifth Circuit's approach to the McDonnellDouglas' method of analyzing individual
disparate treatment discrimination cases. McDonnellDouglas is a process of elimination
in which circumstantial evidence is used progressively to eliminate possible explanations
for the employer's action other than discrimination. Negating all those nondiscriminatory
explanations as substantial reasons for the employer's action leaves a record devoid of any
real reason other than discrimination. Based on the absence of any nondiscriminatory
reason, the factfinder is asked to decide whether it is reasonable to draw the positive
inference that it was the defendant's intent to discriminate that played a role in, and was
the determinative influence in the defendant's decision.3 The approach of the Fifth Circuit
had instead been to progressively eliminate plaintiff's evidence by slicing and dicing it
into discrete parts and then rejecting the probative value of each part because, by itself,
that part did not prove intent to discriminate.4 Having rejected the probative value of most
of plaintiff's evidence, the court's "pretext-plus" rule, requiring additional evidence to
prove discrimination, was simply another way of saying that plaintiff had not introduced
sufficient evidence to prove discrimination. Thus, it was warranted to grant defendant's
motion for summary judgment so the case would not go to the jury-or for judgment as
a matter of law overturning a verdict for the plaintiff if the case had been sent to the jury.
Underpinning the lower court's
pretext-plus rule, as well as its failure to
evaluate all of plaintiff's evidence
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of the use of circumstantial evidence as a way to prove discrimination. This rejection was
tantamount to overturning McDonnell Douglas.
Just as the Fifth Circuit implicitly rejected the idea that circumstantial evidence
could be used to prove discrimination, so too the Supreme Court's rejection of that
assumption was implicit in the approach it took to reviewing the evidence in the record
in the case. Thus, the greater significance of the Supreme Court's decision lies in the way
the Court reviewed the evidence in the record in a McDonnellDouglascase. The Supreme
Court, by the example it set, has refocused McDonnell Douglas to the evidence in the
record and away from the legal formulas that had come to dominate the way courts have
looked at disparate treatment cases. If the lower courts follow the example set by the
Supreme Court,5 the law of individual disparate treatment discrimination will enter a new
era in which the focus of litigation will shift to an holistic view of all the circumstantial
evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences on it rather than the intricate legal
formulas that some courts had been using.
Part I of this paper will discuss the approach of the Fifth Circuit that came close
to eliminating the possibility of using the McDonnell Douglas method of analyzing
individual disparate treatment cases. Part II will demonstrate how the Supreme Court's
rejection of the Fifth Circuit's slicing and dicing approach to circumstantial evidence
reinvigorates McDonnell Douglasby rejecting the lower court's formulaic approach that
obscured the fact that circumstantial evidence can be key to prove the intent of the
defendant to discriminate. Part III will discuss whether Reeves solves the problems that
have plagued the McDonnell Douglas approach. My conclusion is that Reeves does go a
long way to putting the law of individual disparate treatment back on track as a functional
method to help remedy discrimination. If I am right, Reeves is an important step forward.
I. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN REEVES
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,Inc.6 is
a good example of how difficult it had become in some courts to prove discrimination
using circumstantial evidence and relying on the McDonnellDouglasmethod of analysis.
Looking at the whole case, it appeared a strong one for the plaintiff, yet the Fifth Circuit
granted a motion for judgment as a matter of law, thereby overturning a jury verdict for
the plaintiff. Plaintiff, age fifty-seven when he was discharged, had worked for the
company for forty years and had for many years been the supervisor of the regular
production line in the department that made hinges for toilet seats.7 By the time of trial,
the employer had tried without much success three different replacements, all much
younger than plaintiff.' Based on that, the employer conceded that plaintiff had
established a prima facie case of age discrimination because he was discharged, qualified,
in the protected class, and replaced by someone outside the protected class. 9 Defendant
claimed that the reason for plaintiff's discharge was his shoddy recordkeeping of the time
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cards of the employees under his supervision.' ° Additionally, defendant introduced
evidence that three managers were involved in the decision to discharge plaintiff, two of
whom were at least age fifty, that many managers were over fifty and that, at the same
time plaintiff was discharged, a thirty-five-year-old supervisor was also accused of
inaccurate record-keeping." To show that the employer's reason was not the real reason
for his discharge, plaintiff introduced evidence that his record-keeping was not shoddy,
and that the employer had changed its reason from the time he was discharged to the time
of trial.' 2 The defendant initially focused on alleged errors that allowed one particular
employee in plaintiffs department to be overpaid, but, after plaintiff proved that he was
not at work on the days in question so he could not have made the alleged errors, the
employer changed its reason to the more general question of his recordkeeping. 3 Further,
plaintiff introduced evidence that one of the three decisionmakers in plaintiffs
termination, the person with the real power in the plant because of his marriage to the
company president, had earlier described plaintiff as so old that he "must have come over
on the Mayflower," and told him that he was "too damn old to do the job."'4
The trial court sent the case to the jury relying on McDonnell Douglas and the jury
found for plaintiff. On defendant's appeal of the trial court's denial of a judgment as a
matter of law, the Fifth Circuit reversed: "Considering all the evidence in a light most
favorable to Reeves, we nevertheless conclude that there was insufficient evidence for a
jury to find that Sanderson discharged Reeves because of his age."' 5 The reason there was
insufficient evidence in the record as a whole to uphold the jury verdict for plaintiff was
that after the slicing and dicing away of plaintiff's evidence, the only probative evidence
left to support the verdict for plaintiff was his proof that defendant's asserted reason was
not the true reason for plaintiff's discharge.
A simple review of the court's approach demonstrates the devastating effect to
plaintiff's case of this slicing and dicing approach to circumstantial evidence. While
defendant had conceded that plaintiff had established a prima facie case, the evidence
supporting it was dropped from the record. The thrust of that evidence is to negate the
most common, nondiscriminatory reasons an employer might have to explain the action
it took.' 6 Instead of drawing the inference that the usual, nondiscriminatory reasons for
a discharge-plaintiffs lack of qualifications to do the job or that it ended-could not
explain plaintiff s termination, the court instead excised the evidence supporting the prima
facie case from the record. A premise underlying the Fifth Circuit's finding that "Reeves
failed to offer evidence sufficient to prove ... that age is what really triggered Reeve's
discharge"' 7 is the conclusion that the evidence establishing plaintiff's prima facie case
loses all its probative force once the defendant introduces its rebuttal evidence. The
justification for that approach is language from Texas Department.of Community Affairs
v. Burdine'8 that the presumption of discrimination created when the plaintiff initially
proved the prima facie case "drops out of the picture"' 9 once the defendant meets its
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burden of production by introducing evidence raising a factual question that its asserted
reason, not discrimination, explained the adverse action plaintiff was challenging. The
Fifth Circuit's approach is not only to find that the presumption based on the prima facie
case is rebutted, but to use the "drops out of the picture" language to go further and drop
out the probative value of the evidence supporting the prima facie case. Not allowing the
factfinder to draw the negative inference that the most common, nondiscriminatory
reasons do not explain why plaintiffwas fired, means more evidence was necessary before
plaintiff would be able to prove discrimination.
Another type of circumstantial evidence that would support drawing the inference
of discrimination were the age-related comments of one of the decisionmakers.
Characterizing the testimony as "stray remarks," the Fifth Circuit found that it could not
be the basis for the jury to draw the inference of intent to discriminate.
Age-related comments may serve as sufficient evidence of discrimination if the remarks
are (1) proximate in time to the termination; (2) made by an individual with authority over
the challenged employment decision; and (3) related to that employment decision. Mere
"stray remarks"--,i.e., comments which are "vague and remote in time"--however, are
insufficient to establish discrimination.20

While it may be true that these "stray remarks" do not by themselves "establish

discrimination," that is true of all circumstantial evidence. Simply because this testimony
does not conclusively establish that the defendant discharged plaintiff because of his age,
it still is evidence that, if believed, can support the jury in finding that defendant acted
with an intent to discriminate when it fired plaintiff. These remarks do show that a
decisionmaker had the age ofplaintiff as a negative on his mind at some point in time, and
that should support the jury in drawing the inference that he had age on his mind about
plaintiff when he participated in the decisionmaking process that led to plaintiffs
discharge.
By excluding the circumstantial evidence of the prima facie case and of the agerelated comments of one of the decisionmakers, the Fifth Circuit left for review in the

record only plaintiff's evidence that defendant's asserted explanation was a pretext.
Plaintiff's evidence that the defendant's reason was not true, which the court conceded the
jury could accept, was by itself insufficient to prove discrimination because it did not itself
prove that plaintiff was fired because of his age. While, "a reasonable jury could have
found Sanderson's explanation for its employment decision was pretextual, ' 2 "Reeves
failed to offer evidence sufficient to prove both that [the shoddy recordkeeping] reason is
untrue and that age is what really triggered Reeve's discharge. 22 Notice that the court
broke the pretext showing in two. While plaintiff introduced enough evidence to support
drawing the inference that the defendant's reason was not the real reason for the
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defendant's action, he had failed to prove the second part, that this false reason was used
as a cover to hide its discrimination.
Using the circumstantial evidence approach to prove discrimination works by the
process of elimination, that is, by negating the possible nondiscriminatory reasons for
defendant's action. The evidence of the prima facie case operates to negate the inference
that any of the most common, nondiscriminatory reasons explains defendant's action.
Evidence that the defendant's asserted reason was not the real reason for defendant's
action then negates that as a nondiscriminatory reason that could explain defendant's
action. With all the nondiscriminatory reasons that are in the record eliminated, the
factfinder is then empowered to decide whether it is reasonable to draw the positive
inference that "age is what really triggered Reeve's discharge." Instead, the pretext-plus
rule-that plaintiff needs something more to show that "age is what really triggered
Reeve's discharge"--requires additional evidence before the jury has before it sufficient

evidence to draw the inference that defendant acted with an intent to discriminate.23 Given
that the evidence supporting the prima facie case is dropped from the record and that the
other circumstantial evidence, such as the "stray remarks" testimony, is not probative
because by itself it does not prove discrimination, the question is: what sort of evidence
will satisfy the Fifth Circuit? Since the circumstantial evidence plaintiff has elicited has
been discounted, the answer is: some sort of evidence other than circumstantial evidence.

In terms of the type ofevidence recognized as used to prove individual disparate treatment
discrimination, that other kind of evidence seems to be "direct" evidence of intent to
discriminate as established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.24

So, by slicing and dicing away plaintiff's evidence and imposing the requirement
that plaintiff introduce additional evidence under the pretext-plus rule, the only probative
evidence in the record as a whole supporting plaintiff's case consisted ofhis evidence that

the defendant's asserted reason for the discharge-shoddy recordkeeping-was not the
real reason for it. Even drawing every inference in favor of plaintiff on that little bit of
evidence and faced with the evidence introduced by the defendant, the Fifth Circuit found
that no jury reasonably could find for plaintiff.
Despite the potentially damning nature of Chesnut's age-related comments, itis clear that
these comments were not made inthe direct context of Reeves's termination. In addition,
Chesnut was just one of three individuals who recommended to Ms. Sanderson [the
company president and wife of Chesnut] that Reeves be terminated, and there is no
evidence to suggest that any of the other decision makers were motivated by age. In fact,
the record shows that at least two of the decision makers were themselves over the age of
50 - Ms. Sanderson at 52, and Jester at 56. Furthermore, the fact remains that, as a result
of the 1995 investigation, each of the three Hinge Room supervisors was accused of
inaccurate record keeping, including not only Reeves and Caldwell, but 35 year old
Oswalt as well. Finally, there is evidence that, at the time Reeves was dismissed, 20 of
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the company's management positions were filled by people over the age of 50, including
25
several employees in their late 60's.

What is stunning about the Fifth Circuit's use of this test is that it denies almost
all of plaintiff's circumstantial evidence of its probative value in drawing the inference of
intent to discriminate just because each bit by itself is not conclusive proof of the
defendant's intent to discriminate. The proof of plaintiff's prima facie case should not be
dropped from the case just because, by itself, it does not prove discrimination. Here the
prima facie case was conceded so the jury should have been directed to find that the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for discharge-that plaintiff lacked the qualifications
to do the job or the job had ceased to exist--could not be relied upon by the jury to explain
plaintiff's discharge. Further, the evidence of age-related statements by a decision maker
could have been believed and would support drawing the inference that one decisionmaker
not only had age on his mind but also specifically had age on his mind as a negative about
plaintiff.When all this evidence is added to the evidence that the reason defendant asserts
was the reason for the action is not the real reason, no nondiscriminatory reason is left in
the record. Thus, the jury should be empowered to draw the inference that the reason for
the action was discrimination.
If all circumstantial evidence were reviewed for its relevance using the standard
the Fifth Circuit uses for these age-related statements, very little circumstantial evidence
would ever be probative, and summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law would
be dictated in almost all McDonnell Douglascases. Slicing and dicing away the evidence
of a prima facie case of age-related statements made by a decisionmaker about the plaintiff
and of the falseness of defendant's asserted reason because none of this evidence viewed
by itself is conclusive proof of discriminatory intent undermines the possibility that
circumstantial evidence can ever be the basis for a factfinder to conclude that the
employer's act was motivated by an intent to discriminate. Such an approach ultimately
denies that circumstantial evidence can be used to prove intent to discriminate and
suggests that McDonnell Douglas is no longer a viable method of analyzing individual
disparate treatment discrimination cases. Simply put, had the Supreme Court affirmed
rather than reversed Reeves, McDonnellDouglaswould be dead, presumably leaving only
the Price Waterhouse"direct" evidence method of proving individual disparate treatment
discrimination.
II. REEVES IN THE SUPREME COURT.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a unanimous decision, reversed the
Fifth Circuit and decided that the jury verdict should be reinstated.26 The Court first
rejected the Fifth Circuit's pretext-plus rule as inconsistent with the Court's earlier
decision in Hicks.27 Second, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit rule that all the evidence
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in the record is reviewed in deciding motions for summary judgment and judgment as a
matter of law.2" Third, by the way it reviewed all the record evidence in this case, the
Supreme Court implicitly rejected the lower court's slicing and dicing approach of using
a variety of rules to eliminate most of plaintiff's circumstantial evidence from the record
before it was reviewed to decide motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter
of law in individual disparate treatment cases. Because the evidence supporting the prima
facie case-rejecting the defendant's reason as false, showing age-related statements by
a decision maker and other circumstantial evidence-is all probative to a finding of intent
to discriminate, a reviewing court cannot disregard that evidence since it is favorable to
the nonmoving party. Instead, the court must include all that evidence in the record and
then draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, typically the plaintiff.
The last major visit the Supreme Court made to individual disparate treatment law
was in 1993 in St. Mary's Honor Centerv. Hicks.29 In Hicks, the Eighth Circuit held that,
if the plaintiff proved a prima facie case and also proved that the defendant's asserted
reason for the challenged action was not true, then plaintiff was always entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.3° In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court reversed and held
that "the factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant ... may,
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permitthe trier
of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination. ' ' 3' This is the pure
circumstantial evidence approach: by negating the nondiscriminatory reasons put into
evidence for defendant's action, the plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence for the
factfinder to draw the positive inference that discrimination was a determinative influence
in defendant's decision.
His protestations to the contrary notwithstanding,32 Justice Scalia then added dicta
that some lower courts,33 including the Fifth Circuit,3' took to be an invitation to further
narrow the law by suggesting that, to establish liability, the plaintiff had to adduce
evidence over and above the evidence establishing the prima facie case and the falsity of
the defendant's asserted reason for the action. He said, "a reason cannot be proved to be
'a pretextfor discrimination'unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason., 35 Breaking down what needs to be proved into two
separate parts suggested that something more was required of plaintiffs beyond merely
proving her prima facie case and the falsity of defendant's explanation. This additional
requirement came to be known as the "pretext-plus" rule.
The unanimous Court in Reeves reaffirmed the actual holding in Hicks and, in
rejecting the pretext-plus rule, rejected Justice Scalia's dicta. In an opinion by Justice
O'Connor, the Court held that "a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient
evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of
fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated., 36 Thus, the Court rejected
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the Fifth Circuit's rule that a defendant is always entitled to judgment as a matter of law
when "the plaintiff's case consists exclusively of a prima facie case of discrimination and
sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant's legitimate,
'
nondiscriminatory explanation for its action." 37
The reason for the rejection of the pretext-plus rule goes to the heart of why the
whole approach of the Fifth Circuit to McDonnellDouglas cases was wrong: rejecting the
idea that circumstantial evidence is inadequate to prove discrimination, the Court
concluded that circumstantial evidence can be used to prove discrimination even though
each individual piece of it does not, by itself, prove discrimination.3" "[A]lthough the
presumption of discrimination 'drops out of the picture' once the defendant meets its
burden of production [Hicks] . . , the trier of fact may still consider the evidence

establishing the plaintiff's prima facie case 'and inferences properly drawn therefrom..
on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual,' Burdine."39
Just as the circumstantial evidence supporting plaintiff's prima facie case continues
to have probative value after the defendant puts on evidence of its reason, so does the
evidence that plaintiff introduced that defendant's reason was false. "Proof that the
defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial
evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive..
.. In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the
explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose."
Evoking pre-Burdineauthority, Justice O'Connor concluded by restating the consequences
for the employer of having its reason rejected by the factfinder. "[O]nce the employer's
justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative
explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual
reason for its decision." 41
In addition to the unchallenged evidence establishing a prima facie case and that
defendant's reason was false, there was the evidence of the age-related comments of the
one decisionmaker, Chesnut, and the evidence that he was the actual decisionmaker
behind Reeve's firing.
[W]hile acknowledging "the potentially damning nature"of Chesnut's age-related
comments, the court discounted them on the ground that they "were not made in the direct
context of Reeve's termination." And the court discredited petitioner's evidence that
Chesnut was the actual decisionmaker by giving weight to the fact that there was "no
evidence to suggest that any of the other decision makers were motivated by age.' ' 2

Moreover, by crediting defendant's evidence, the "court also failed to draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of [Reeves]."4'
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Moreover, the other evidence on which the court relied-that Caldwell and Oswalt were
also cited for poor recordkeeping, and that respondent employed many managers over age
50-although relevant, is certainly not dispositive... In concluding that these
circumstances so overwhelmed the evidence favoring petitioner that no rational trier of
fact could have found that petitioner was fired because of his age, the Court of Appeals
impermissibly substituted its judgment concerning the weight of the evidence for the
jury's."

To drive home the point of how serious the Fifth Circuit had blundered in its approach,
the Court found that no retrial was necessary but that the original verdict should be
reinstated: "Given the evidence in the record supporting petitioner, we see no reason to
subject the parties to an additional round of litigation before the Court of Appeals rather
'
than to resolve the matter here." 45
So, circumstantial evidence can be used to prove individual disparate treatment
discrimination through the process of negating the possible nondiscriminatory reasons for
the challenged action and then drawing the positive inference that intent to discriminate
did motivate the employer. On the assumption that the employer had some reason for the
action it took, the McDonnell Douglas method, as it stands after Reeves, allows for
plaintiff to get to the factfinder and to win by showing that the possible nondiscriminatory
reasons are not the real reasons for the decision plaintiff challenges. Proof of a prima facie
case eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the action; and proof that
the reasons defendant articulated to explain the decision do not in fact do so leaves no
basis in the evidence in the record that a nondiscriminatory reason could substantially
explain the action. Without any nondiscriminatory reason to explain the action, it is
generally permissible for the case to go to the factfinder and for the factfinder, based on
the negative finding that no nondiscriminatory reason explains the action, to draw the
positive inference that the real reason is discrimination.
The reaffirmed Hicks stands for the proposition that eliminating the
nondiscriminatory reasons for the defendant's action does not mandate judgment for the
plaintiff. Reeves rejects the proposition that judgment for the defendant is mandated when
the evidence supporting the plaintiff is limited to evidence proving the prima facie case
and that defendant's reason is not the real reason for the action.' The Court did not,
however, go the final step and decide that a showing by the plaintiff of a prima facie case
plus sufficient evidence to find the employer's reason is false will always get plaintiff to
the factfinder or will "always be adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability."
Sometimes, even with evidence of plaintiff's prima facie case and of the falsity of
defendant's rebuttal explanation, "no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was
discriminatory." ' The factors that could lead a trial court to take a case from the
factfinder include "the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of
the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the
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employer's case and that properly may be considered on a motion forjudgment as a matter
of law."' 9
Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring opinion, indicated that it should be
"uncommon" for these cases to be taken from the jury.5" That should happen only when
it is conclusively demonstrated, by evidence the district court is required to credit on a
motion for judgment as a matter of law that discrimination could not have been the
defendant's true motivation. If such conclusive demonstrations are (as I suspect) atypical,
if follows that the ultimate question of liability ordinarily should not be taken from the
jury once the plaintiff has introduced the two
categories of evidence [of the prima facie
5'
false]
was
reason
defendant's
that
and
case
III. DOES REEVES SOLVE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS' PROBLEMS?
The McDonnellDouglas approach to the proof of individual disparate treatment
has, especially since Hicks, been the subject of much criticism. 2 If Reeves merely
reaffirms Hicks, then it is unlikely that the problems with McDonnell Douglas will be
solved. After Hicks, Professor Deborah Malamud analyzed the McDonnellDouglas line
of individual disparate treatment cases and concluded that a fundamental weakness in that
approach was that "the Court's prior disparate treatment decisions.., never succeeded in
setting the prima facie case threshold high enough to permit the proven prima facie case
to support a sufficiently strong inference of discrimination to mandate judgment for the
plaintiff when combined only with disbelief of the employer's stated justification."53 The
Reeves Court did not hold that judgment for plaintiff is mandated but has found that the
evidence supporting the prima facie case plus evidence that defendant's reason is false is
sufficient to support a factfinder drawing the inference of intent to discriminate unless "no
rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory."5 Further, in
reviewing that evidence plus the other circumstantial evidence for the purpose of deciding
motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, the Court indicated that
every inference must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, typically the plaintiff."
The question is whether the loophole left by Reeves will continue to plague
McDonnell Douglasas it had after Hicks. Professor Deborah Calloway has argued that
Hicks should be overruled and replaced with the rule that a plaintiffis entitled to judgment
as a matter of law when she proves her prima facie case and that defendant's asserted
reason for its action is not the real reason. 6 Professor Calloway's justification is that the
Supreme Court in Hicks, and the legal system generally, underestimate the rampant nature
of discrimination." Justice Scalia's opinion in Hicks exudes that skepticism about the
continuing severity of discrimination and seems to suggest through his inclusion of a
bizarre hypothetical that it is much worse if an innocent employer is found liable for
discrimination than ifa guilty one is exculpated from liability."
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Professor Catherine J. Lanctot, who before Hicks identified the emergence among
the lower courts of the pretext-plus rule59 and who still prefers the rule that would mandate
judgment as a matter of law once a plaintiff proves the prima facie case and the
defendant's reason was not the real reason,' criticizes Reeves because it merely restates
Hicks which, she says, merely restated Burdine. Since she criticizes all three cases for not
developing a true rule of law, she thinks history'will repeat itself, a forecast that initially
seems to be true.6 Though it adds a burden to plaintiffs, Lanctot proposes turning Reeves
into a proper rule of law, which she calls a "pretext-always" rule that would entitle
plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law if she can prove a prima facie case, prove
defendant's reason was not the real reason and then, additionally, prove "that any other
reason that may be inferred fiom the evidence was not the real reason for the employment
action."62 This rule is designed to close the loophole left in Justice O'Connor's opinion
in Reeves because it forecloses the possibility that the record "conclusively revealed some
other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision," or "abundant and
uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.'6 3 In essence,
Professor Lanctot is proposing that the final step of Reeves-that the factfinder make the
affirmative finding that the defendant acted with an intent to discriminate-be replaced
with plaintiffs added burden to disprove all reasons other than nondiscrimination that
could be found by the factfmder as the real reason for the defendant's action.
The problem with this proposal is that it entails proving the nonexistence of an
unknown. Plaintiff would seem to be required to imagine every reason that could be
inferred from the evidence, even if there is no evidence in the record as to those reasons,
and then prove that none of these reasons explained defendant's decision. The facts in
Hicks show the difficulty of the problem. The trial judge, as factfinder, did not draw the
inference of discrimination because it seemed to him that the real reason plaintiff was
discharged was a personality conflict between plaintiff and his new supervisor. The
problem under Professor Lanctot's proposed rule is that plaintiff would be expected to
imagine and then disprove that the real reason was this personality conflict despite the fact
that the only evidence in the record about that was the denial by the supervisor that he had
such a conflict with plaintiff. Instructing a jury about how this works would be
challenging.' 4
The aim of this article is to show that Reeves does more than reaffirm Hicks.
Instead of the quarrelsome tone and the skepticism of Hicks, Justice O'Connor appears to
be much more accepting of the use of approaches normal to the trial process of civil cases
generally. By refocusing McDonnell Douglas circumstantial evidence cases on that
evidence and on the inferences that can be drawn from it, the Court has moved in the
direction recommended by many critics of McDonnellDouglas.6 Thus, David N. Rosen
and Jonathan M. Freiman argue that the problem of unarticulated reasons floating in the
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background of the trial of an individual disparate treatment case can be contained in
discovery and in the use of trial memoranda:
[P]laintiffs should ask defendants in depositions and interrogatories to identify all the
reasons that may have played any part in the adverse employment decision at issue. Those
discovery requests should be followed with requests for admission [pursuant to Federal
Rule 36] asking the defendant to admit that there are no reasons for its action other than
those that have been identified. A trial memorandum... can further specify and limit the
potential explanations for a defendant's decision that the jury is entitled to consider.'

While that careful trial preparation still may not foreclose the factfinder from failing to be
convinced that the defendant did act with an intent to discriminate, Professor Michael
Selmi proposes that plaintiff's introduce broader testimony as to the nature of
discrimination and how our cognitive functions may blind us to its reality.67
Ultimately, the focus on the evidence in the record in Reeves seems to adopt the
approach suggested by federal Judge Denny Chin for the proper way for courts to decide
motions for summary judgment and for judgment as a matter of law.
The best approach is perhaps the most basic one: first, evaluating plaintiff's proof, direct
or otherwise, of discrimination; second, evaluating defendant's proof that it did not
discriminate, including evidence of defendant's explanation for its employment decision;
and third, evaluating the evidence as a whole. Courts should focus on the "ultimate issue"
of whether the plaintiff has proven that it is more likely than not that the employer's
decision was motivated at least in part by an impermissible or discriminatory reason. In
a summary judgment context or on a motion for judgment as a matter of law following a
verdict for the plaintiff, the court must evaluate the evidence as a whole resolving all
conflicts in the proof and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff."

Relying on these standard civil trial techniques, Reeves may not lead to all cases going to
the factfinder when plaintiff has introduced evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the prima facie case has been established and that defendant's asserted reason is not the
real reason but it should lead to most individual disparate treatment cases surviving a
motion for summary judgment and going to the factfinder and many fewer judgments as
a matter of law being granted overturning jury verdicts for plaintiffs.
III. CONCLUSION
By going through the exercise of including all of plaintiff's evidence in the record
when deciding defendant's motions for summary judgment and for judgment as a matter
of law and of reviewing that evidence carefully to draw out of it all inferences that favor
the plaintiff, the Court in Reeves is leading by good example. By rejecting the pretext-plus
rule which implicitly rejects the use ofcircumstantial evidence and by rejecting the slicing
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and dicing away of that circumstantial evidence, Justice O'Connor has taken important
steps to redirect the focus of individual disparate treatment law away for formulaic
approaches - such as the slicing and dicing approach of the Fifth Circuit in Reeves - that
give enormous discretion to courts in their exercise of the power to grant summary
judgment or judgment as a matter of law. Instead, the new direction she suggests by her
careful scrutiny of the evidence in the record that courts should move toward the approach
used in civil litigation outside employment discrimination law. Her holistic approach to
individual disparate treatment law bodes well for the future if the lower courts follow her
good example.
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constitutes "direct" evidence for the purpose of applying the "direct" evidence method of
analyzing individual disparate treatment cases based on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989). In Brown v. East MississippiElectricPowerAssn., 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir.
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in an action tried by a jury is a challenge to the legal
A motion for judgment as a matter of law ...
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict." We review the denial of such motions de
novo, applying the same standard as the district court. A JML is appropriate if the "facts and
inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that a reasonable jury could
not have concluded" as the jury did. Applying this standard to the instant case, the district court's
judgment should be reversed only if "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
reasonable jury to find" that Sanderson discharged Reeves because of his age. Id. at 691.
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In InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977), the

17.
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Court explained why proof of a prima facie case in McDonnell Douglas supported the inference of
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from the two most common legitimate reasons on which an employer might rely to reject a job
applicant: an absolute or relative lace of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job
sought. Elimination of these reasons for the refusal to hire is sufficient, absent other explanation, to
create an inference that the decision was a discriminatory one."
197 F.3dat 692.
450 U.S. 248 (1981).
See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511(1993). .
197 F.3d at 692 (quoting Brown v. CSCLogic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir.1996)). While
somewhat broader than the classic definition of "direct" evidence that the Fifth Circuit uses as the
threshold to the application of Price Waterhouse, this definition of when evidence of age-related
comments is circumstantial evidence supporting a finding of intent to discriminate is the definition
several other circuits use to describe evidence that is sufficiently "direct" to trigger the application
of Price Waterhouse. See Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mutual InsuranceCos., 968 F.2d 171 (2d Cir.
1992); Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 470 (3d Cir. 1993) (following Ostrowski),

21.
22.
23.

overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (1995) (en banc).
Reeves, 197 F.3d at 693.
Id. at 692.
Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 343 (6th Cir. 1997) (the court described the
"pretext-plus" rule this way: "The plaintiff must not only demonstrate that the employer's asserted
reasons were pretextual, but the plaintiff also must introduce additional evidence of
discrimination.").
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490 U.S. 228 (1989). The Fifth Circuit rule as to what constitutes "direct" evidence of
discrimination for purposes of applying the Price Waterhouse method of analyzing individual
disparate treatment is the narrow notion of "evidence which, if believed, proves the facts without
inference or presumption." Brown v. East Mississippi Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th
Cir. 1993). For a discussion of this narrow test of what is "direct" evidence, see Michael J.
Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structureof DisparateTreatment DiscriminationLitigation, 30
GA. L. REV. 563,611-16 (1996) [hereinafter, Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure]. While

the Supreme Court has not defined what is direct evidence, the lower courts have developed a
number of different approaches. For a discussion of these approaches, see Michael J. Zimmer,
Chaos or Coherence: IndividualDisparateTreatment Discriminationand the ADEA, 51 Mercer

25.
26.

27.
28.
29.

30.
31.

32.

L. Rev. 693 (2000).
197 F.3d at 693-694.
Certiorari was granted on three questions:
1. Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, is direct evidence of
discriminatory intent required to avoid judgment as a matter of law?
2. In determining whether to grant judgment as a matter of law under FED. R. Civ. P.
50, should a district judge weigh all of the evidence or consider only the evidence
favoring the nonmoving party?
3. Is the standard for granting judgment as a matter of law under FED. R. Civ. P. 56 the
same as the standard for granting judgment as a matter of law under FED. R. Civ. P.
50?
Answering the first question "no," the Court found the answer to the second question to be an easy
"yes." Describing the conflict among the circuits as "more semantic than real," the Court
concluded that "in entertaining a judgment as a matter of law, the court should review all of the
evidence in the record." 530 U.S. at 150. Thus, the Fifth Circuit rule on what evidence is to be
reviewed in deciding a judgment as a matter of law was affirmed. The third question was not
answered directly; instead the Court relied on the authority under Rule 56, "that the court must
review the record 'taken as a whole,"' to support its conclusion that "the standard for granting
summary judgment 'mirrors' the standard for judgment as a matter of law...." Id. The main
thrust, then, of the procedural section of the opinion focused on the way in which the Fifth Circuit
had in this particular case erroneously applied its rule that all the evidence in the record is
reviewed in deciding a judgment as a matter of law.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000).
See id. at 150.
509 U.S. at 502. That same year the Court also decided Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604
(1993), which narrowed the circumstantial evidence upon which the inference of discrimination
can be drawn while expanding the reasons that defendant may assert to sustain its rebuttal burden.
See Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure,supra note 24, at 570-72.
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
Id.

See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 512 n.4. In a footnote, Justice Scalia said that "there is nothing whatever
inconsistent between this statement [of the holding] and our later statements that (1)
the plaintiff
must show 'both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason,' and (2) 'it
is not enough... to dis believe the employer.' Even though (as we say here) rejection of the
defendant's proffered reasons is enough at law to sustain a finding of discrimination, there must be
afinding of discrimination."
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See Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997)(en banc); Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder
Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436 (11th Cir. 1996); Theard v. Glaxo, Inc., 47 F.3d 676 (4th Cir.
1995); Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255 (1st Cir. 1994).
34. Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
35. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515.
36. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. Justice O'Connor explained Hicks as holding "that the rejection of the
employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action does not compel judgment for the
plaintiff [but) it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination for the
falsity of the employer's explanation." Id. at 147.
37. Id. at 137.
38. See id. at 147.
39. Id. at 143.
40. Id. at 147.
41. Id. at 146 (citing Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)). ("[W]hen all
legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the
employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts with
some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration"). Id.
42. Id. at 152-53.
43. Id. at 152.
44. Id. at 152, quoting decision of the Fifth Circuit (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 153.
46. See Catherine J. Lanctot, Secrets and Lies: The Needfor a Definitive Rule ofLaw in Pretext
Cases, 61 LA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
47. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. This holding merely aligns discrimination law with how litigation in
general is treated. Thus, Justice O'Connor said,
To hold otherwise would be effectively to insulate an entire category of employment
discrimination cases from review under Rule 50, and we have reiterated that trial courts should not
"'treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact."' Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. Justice O'Connor describes several scenarios where judgment as a matter of law would be
appropriate.
For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record
conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the
plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there
was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred. Id.
Surprisingly, Justice O'Connor appeared to leave one type of evidence off the list, evidence
supporting drawing the inference of discrimination even though it does not either prove the
elements of plaintiff's barebones prima facie case as set forth in McDonnell Douglas or prove that
defendant's reason is false. She may, however, be using the term "prima facie case"in the more
general sense of the ultimate burden the plaintiff has to prove that she was a victim of defendant's
discrimination. As she said earlier in her opinion, "[tihe ultimate question is whether the employer
intentionally discriminated." Id. at 146. That interpretation is bolstered by the next section of the
opinion which looks at all the evidence supporting plaintiff's case.
50. See id. at 154.
51. Id. at 154-55. She did "note that it may be incumbent on the Court, in an appropriate case, to
define more precisely the circumstances in which plaintiffs will be required to submit evidence
33.
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See, Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proofin Employment Discrimination
Litigation: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the "Personality"Excuse, 18
BERKELEY J. EMPLOYMENT &LAB. L. 183 (1997); William R. Corbett, OfBabies, Bathwater,and
Throwing Out ProofStructures: It Is Not Time to Jettison McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMPLOYEE RTs.
& EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 361 (1998); Melissa A. Essary, The Dismantlingof McDonnell Douglas
v. Green: The High Court Muddies the Evidentiary Waters in CircumstantialDiscrimination
Cases, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 385 (1994); Ruth Gana Okediji, Status Rules: Doctrine as Discrimination
in a Post-Hicks Environment, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 49 (1998); Stephen Plass, Truth: The Lost
Virtue in Title VII Litigation,29 SETON HALL L. REV. 599 (1998); Sherie L. Coons, Proving
DisparateTreatment After St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Is Anything Left After McDonnell
Douglas?, 19 J. CORP. L. 379 (1994); Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies, and Ideology: The Wages of
Sin is Now Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939 (1995).
53. Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: DisparateTreatment After Hicks, 93 MIcH. L. REV. 2229,
2236-37 (1995).
54. 530 U.S. at 148.
55. For criticism of the way courts have been deciding summary judgment motions, see Ann C.
McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use ofSummary Judgment
in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203 (1993); Kenneth RL Davis, The Stumbling,
Three-Step Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment DiscriminationCases, 61 BROOK. L. REV.
703 (1995).
56. See Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioningthe BasicAssumption,
52.

26 CONN. L. REv. 997 (1994).

57.

See id. See also, Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment DiscriminationCases So Hard to Win? 61
LA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
58. The hypothetical involves an employer who fires the manager whose decision plaintiff challenges
so that the employer cannot come up with testimony of the real reason for the manager's decision
since he would now be a witness hostile to the employer.
59. Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the PlaintiffLoses: The Fallacy of the "PretextPlus" Rule in Employment DiscriminationCases, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 57 (1991).
60. Lanctot, supra note 46.
61. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing,supra note 4.
62. Lanctot, supranote 46. The full statement of her proposed rule is as follows:
A plaintiff in an individual disparate treatment case is entitled to judgment, as a matter
of law, if that plaintiff, by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. Proves all the elements of the prima facie case, as set forth in McDonnell Douglas
and its progeny; and
2. Proves that the reason offered by the defendant was not the real reason for the
employment action; and
3. Proves that any other reason that may be inferred from the evidence was not the real
reason for the employment action.
63. Id.
64. Telling a jury that plaintiff had to disprove any nondiscriminatory reason that was not in the record
as a reason but that could be inferred from the evidence in the record is, at a minimum, dense. It
may suggest a standard of proof approaching the beyond reasonable doubt standard applicable in
criminal cases.
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See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias Approach to
DiscriminationandEqual Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995); Davis, supra
note 55; Mary Ellen Maatman, Choosing Words and Creating Worlds: The Supreme Court's
Rhetoric and Its Constitutive Effects on Employment DiscriminationLaw, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1
(1998).
David N. Rosen & Jonathan M. Freiman, Remodeling McDonnell Douglas: Fisher v. Vassar
College and the Structure of Employment DiscriminationLaw, 17 QuINIPILc L. REv. 725, 776
(1998).
Selmi, Employment DiscriminationCases,supra note 57.
Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Methodfor
Assessing Evidence in DiscriminationCases, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 659,672 (1998).
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